The Battleground Region

By Fikru Helebo

A full year has passed since the May 15th 2005 elections, elections that briefly gave hope for a nation that has never known good political leadership in its modern history. And a lot has been written about the fact that the elections were neither free nor fair and about the political turmoil that ensued in the aftermath of the elections. The fact that the ruling party, the EPRDF, stole victory from the combined opposition* is undeniable to most analysts who follow Ethiopian politics closely. If you are one who still doubts whether or not the EPRDF stole the May 2005 elections from the Ethiopian people, then an analysis of the elections at the Ethiopian News and Views web site here is a good place to start.

In this article I would like to focus on the result of the elections from the Southern region. In my opinion, the result of the elections from the Southern region (SNNPR), a region constituting at least 20% of the Ethiopian population, is of high importance since the result shows that this is the only region of Ethiopia where the elections were hotly contested by more than two parties in a great majority of the constituencies. The implication of this for the next elections, if they are to be free and fair, is that the Southern region will most likely be the region where the contest for the control of parliament in its current form, with 547 seats, will be the closest, making it the battleground region of the next election.

In the two most populous regions of the country, the two largest opposition groups will dominate the elections without a doubt. The Oromo Liberation Front (OLF), if it is wise enough to put its trust in the will of the people and enter electoral politics, will most certainly be the dominant party in the Oromo region, where 178 seats are allocated for the region, and the Coalition for Unity and Democracy (CUD) with a strong support base among the Amharas will do very well in the Amhara region, where 138 seats are allocated to the region. With 274 seats in parliament needed to form a governing majority, the OLF and the CUD will then need to do well on their own in the other regions or form alliances with other parties of similar persuasion who have strong following in regions other than Amhara or Oromo.

This is where the Southern region comes in to the picture. The Southern region, with 123 seats allocated for it in parliament, is the third largest region in the country and a rich vote mine for a party that can appeal to the seemingly divergent interests of the various ethnic groups that make up the Southern region. Although the Southern region was created in 1992 without the consent of the governed, the 2005 elections have demonstrated that the region has a political clout that rivals that of the Oromo and Amhara regions, if only the political class of the region know how to take advantage of it. To understand why the Southern region is of great importance for a winning strategy in the next election, it is imperative that one look at the election data for the region from the May 2005 elections which is available at the web site of the National Electoral Board of Ethiopia (NEBE).


Figure 1

The first thing you will notice in Figure 1 is that the EPRDF got 49% of all the valid ballots cast in the Southern region on its way to "winning" 93 out of the 123 seats allocated for the Southern region. Now, if anyone can convince me that one out of two Southern Ethiopians did really choose the EPRDF over the opposition candidates which were available for them, then I will be the first one to congratulate the EPRDF for its victory. This can't possible be true since the EPRDF is deeply unpopular among Southerners. Let alone half the votes, it can not win a quarter of votes in the Southern region in a free and fair election. The EPRDF winning in the South is simply an unthinkable proposition and I will not waste any more of your time to try to convince you that the EPRDF was not the choice of Southern Ethiopians in the May 2005 elections.

The more interesting data in Figure 1 is how well the relatively new party, the CUD, did in the Southern region despite the fact this was its very first entry on the ballot in the South. According to the NEBE figures, the CUD won 18 of the 123 seats for parliament by taking 22% of the 3,664,404 valid ballots cast in the Southern region. Whereas the more established party in the South and one that participated in the May 2000 elections in the Southern region, the United Ethiopian Democratic Forces (UEDF) / Southern Ethiopia Peoples Democratic Coalition (SEPDC), won only 12 seats by taking a meager 10% of all the valid ballots cast in the Southern region, which is 5% less than the votes Southerners gave to candidates other than the four major contenders in the South.

Zone	Total Ballots Cast	CUD	UEDF/SEPDC	SLM
BASKETO LIYU	11025	24%	0%	n/a
AMEYA	23403	15%	2%	n/a
SHEKA	78118	33%	4%	n/a
ALABA LIYU	98191	10%	4%	n/a
DAWRO	100910	31%	4%	n/a
SOUTH OMO	112632	16%	8%	n/a
BENCH MAJI	132029	10%	10%	n/a
KEMBATA TEMBARO	159628	7%	44%	n/a
SELTI	160785	3%	0%	n/a
GEDEO	233178	10%	14%	n/a
KEFFA	252181	15%	4%	n/a
GURAGE	365811	56%	6%	n/a
HADIYA	369040	5%	45%	n/a
WELAYITA	388003	29%	6%	n/a
GAMO GOFA	436236	33%	3%	n/a
SIDAMA	743604	17%	n/a	19%

Figure 2

Another set of interesting data can be found in Figure 2 above where the percentages of the valid ballots cast in the May 2005 elections is given for the three major opposition parties in each zones of the Southern region. There were more than twice as many valid ballots cast for the CUD (792,633) as there were for the UEDF/SEPDC (363,151). The CUD was strongest in Gurage zone, wining 10 of the 13 seats available by taking 56% of the valid ballots cast. The UEDF/SEPDC was strongest in Hadiya and Kembatta Tembaro zones, winning 12 of 16 seats available and taking 45% and 44% of the valid ballots cast in the two zones respectively. In zones out side of Hadiya, Kembatta Tembaro and Gurage zones, which were stronghold zones for the UEDF/SEPDC and the CUD, the CUD did significantly better than the UEDF/SEPDC, taking 21% of the valid ballots cast to UEDF/SEPDC's 8%. Of particular note was CUD's far better performance in Wolaita and Gamo Gofa zones where the CUD took 29% and 33% of the valid ballots cast compared to UEDF/SEPDC's 6% and 3% respectively.

In Figure 2, it is interesting to note that the total valid ballots cast in Sidama zone (743,604) comprised 20% of the total valid ballots cast in the entire Southern region. This is almost the same as the next two vote rich zones combined (22%). The Sidama zone is the only major area in the South where a party that is based on a single ethnic identity, the Sidama Liberation Movement (SLM), did well by taking 19% of the valid ballots cast. If the elections were free and fair, there is no question that the SLM or other Sidama-based parties would have won most of the 19 seats available in Sidama zone. It is also worth noting that the CUD did well in Sidama, taking 17% of the valid ballots cast in this pivotal zone of the Southern region. The UEDF/SEPDC was not on the ballot in Sidama. It seems that it may have defered to the SLM in Sidama zone.

The election results from the Southern region offer us a lot more than just statistics; I believe it offers us a glimpse into the future of Ethiopian politics. There are two opposing voting trends that can be drawn from these election results. The first and obvious trend is that the CUD has become a party of choice among Southerners who would like to see an end to the ethnicization of politics. The second and less obvious trend is that ethnicity still is a powerful factor in Ethiopian politics as was clearly manifested by the strength the SLM exhibited in Sidama zone. The strong performances of the UEDF/SEPDC in Hadiya and Kembatta Tembaro zones and the dominance of the CUD in Gurage zone can be attributed to ethnic affiliations of the leaderships of the two parties. I believe ethnicity played a role in most of the constituencies where the opposition groups did well throught the country.

I am of the view that the results of the May 2005 elections gave a clear signal to the Ethiopian political class that ethnicity should not be the driving force of Ethiopian politics. However, I am also of the view that it would be utterly stupid for a political party to think that ethnicity does not matter in politics. It does, whether we like it or not! In the evolution of the Ethiopian nation state, we have a long ways to go before ethnicity can be considered a low priority issue as it needs to be. Until we arrive at such a time though, the trick for a successful political party will be to find a pragmatic way to address the aspirations and concerns of the various ethnic groups and balance that with ideas that address their common future. The prime testing ground for this balancing act will most likely be the Southern region.

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* I do not believe that a single political party had won the majority of the seats in parliament. The "combined opposition" that I am referring to is the CUD, UEDF and OFDM. Obviously, the CUD did far better than its main rival from among the opposition, the UEDF. The UEDF that participated in the May 2005 election is no more. It has split, albeit unofficially, into two camps: a domestic-based group led by Beyene Petros and a Diaspora-based group that is anchored by the Ethiopian People Revolutionary Party (EPRP). Since the election the CUD has wisely transformed itself from a coalition to a unitary party. However, the imprisonment of its leaders presents the CUD with major challenges ahead.

AFD, the Flicker of hope or . . .?

By Ephrem Madebo

The people of Ethiopian have always been ready to die defending their country from external enemies, but they have been hesitant, indecisive, and reluctant to die for domestic causes. From General Mengistu Neway’s endeavor to get rid of the feudal regime to General Teferi Benti’s attempt to topple Colonel Mengistu and to the infamous "Ginbot Siminent" Military coup, Ethiopians repeatedly failed to root out internal enemies. In July 2005, 38 people died protesting the result of the May 2005 election, two months latter, another 40 people died and the entire CUD leadership was rounded up and sent to prison. Recently, in Nepal, the death of 14 people, the dusk to dawn curfew, and the number of armored vehicles around Kathmandu did not deter Nepalese from protesting and fighting for the return of the parliamentary system. In Ethiopia, the mass protest that started with upbeat took a long pose after sacrificing more than hundred people. For how long do we Ethiopians keep on sacrificing our people and yet not get the job done?

In 1991, when TPLF dethroned Colonel Mengistu and controlled Addis Ababa, OLF was part of the transition government , however, it pulled itself out of the TG because Meles and company did not want to share power with anyone outside the TPLF elite. In its 33 years history, the objective of the OLF has always been to form an independent Oromo state, and this objective has distanced many opposition parties from OLF. As a result, in the last 15 years, the Ethiopian opposition lacked a unified leadership and the political fire that could have come from the Oromo Liberation front. The recent good will and readiness of CUDP and the Oromo Liberation Front to form an alliance and work together with other opposition parties should be seen as a sign of victory to the Ethiopian people and the beginning of the end for the TPLF criminal regime.

The new beginning of AFD is qualitatively different from all past political alliances that appeared and disappeared. AFD seems to be the first alliance that truly represents all segments of the Ethiopian people, and of course the first alliance to include liberation fronts such as OLF and ONLF, once considered taboos. The recent hasty and misguided comments that dismiss the usefulness of AFD by citing OLF as an ethnic organization are myopic in nature and lack the understanding of the past and current political dynamics of Ethiopia. Yes, OLF is an ethnic organization that fights for one particular ethnic group, so are TPLF (Tigray People Liberation Front), SLF (Sidama People Liberation Front), and ONLF (Ogaden National Liberation front). As we all know , an alliance is not a forum of identical thought, it is a forum where people or groups of different ideas converge to a common idea that enables them to work together. If we closely analyze the Sidama, the Oromo and the Ogaden people, none of these people are properly represented by CUDP, UEDF or any other major opposition party. A closer look of the May 2005 election clearly shows that the Oromya, the Ogaden and the Southern zones were the three main places where EPRDF had a relatively strong footing compared to UEDF and CUDP. So looking forward for the 2010 election, why should it be wrong if CUDP and UEDF create a political alliance with OLF, SLF, and ONLF?

In Ethiopia, there are many opposition parties, but there has never been a nationally accepted alliance that has the potential to propel the popular movement, hence, the struggle of the Ethiopian people for justice and democracy was always contained by dictators. Individually, the different opposition parties have done their best to break the backbone of the TPLF regime, however, their non-co-ordinated effort couldn't damage the regime in a noticeable way. For example, when CUDP and UEDF make a call for a stay home strike, OLF orders its constituency to withhold marketable supplies, and the civic group Tegbar-League orders students and other segments of the society to wage civil disobedience; and yet there are some other opposition groups that claim to waging a parliamentary struggle. What one party considers as victory is noting to others who have a different set of objectives. How can one define success and be successful in the face of such a fragmented and disjoint objective?

After years of individual journey and fragmented struggle, it seems that the different Ethiopian opposition groups have agreed to board on the same boat and sail together. In the political history of modern Ethiopia, for the first time Ethiopians have forged an alliance that truly represents the Ethiopian people. Evidently, one should not be overjoyed with the formation of the Alliance for Freedom and Democracy by the OLF, CUDP,ONLF, SLF and EPPF, however, all Ethiopians inside and outside Ethiopia should say "AMEN" to the latest holy news that originated from the Dutch city of Utrecht. Yes, the cake is not yet baked, it is being mixed, but we can still be optimists and lend it a yeast for it will not be baked before it is mixed.

A political alliance can be stable or unstable depending on the nature of the groups that created the alliance. In an alliance, no group would compromise its underlying core value overnight, likewise, no group would join an alliance knowing that another groupn’s non-compromising core value contradicts its core value throughout the life of the alliance. Obviously, OLF, CUDP, ONLF, SLF, and EPPF, should have critically analyzed their comfort zone of give and take (compromise) before they ratified the formation of AFD. There is one important question that we all should ask ourselves - Why do people form a liberation front? From what do the Oromos, the Sidamas and the Ogaden people want to be liberated? The answer to this question is unambiguous, people want to be liberated from all types of oppression and social and economic injustice. Is there any condition that the Oromos, the Sidams, and the Ogaden people enjoy justice and democracy within the framework of a democratically reincarnated Ethiopia? If the answer to this question is yes, then OLF, ONLF, and SLF should be part of the reincarnation process. We can’t change objective realities in Ethiopia without embracing major players like OLF. In my opinion, AFD is the first stage in the process of creating a true democratic Ethiopia, therefore, Ethiopians should not deny this newly born alliance the benefit of the doubt. If we want to see AFD as a matured alliance that respects ethnic identities and transcends ethnic politics, we should clear our ethnic infested mode of thinking and work together for the formation of united Ethiopia.

The Alliance for Freedom and Democracy will achieve its goals if the member parties develop trust between each other before going in to any kind of major social contract. As we all know, the imprudent political and economic relations of the past hundred years have drained the trust that one group has for the other. Therefore, any party that desires to earn the trust of others should earn trust by trusting others. All in all, trust needs transparency, respect, and believing in democratic principles. Trust is the only factor that compels OLF, SLF and ONLF to build a united Ethiopia abandoning their long time objective of secession. The element of trust is not limited to the parties that formed the alliance, all Ethiopians should trust each other and work together by putting the past behind us. If there is a strong determination and will to correct Ethiopia’s ugly past, AFD is the sparkle of hope for millions of Ethiopians, otherwise it will be yet another marriage domed for divorce.

A Call to Nonviolence

By Fikru Helebo

I wrote an article back in December 1994 with the same title as the title of this posting that was published by Ethiopian Review magazine. The political climate in Ethiopia that led me to write that article is essentially the same today as it was back then and, unfortunately, in some ways it is worse now than it was back then. I am pleased that the idea which I attempted to advocate over a decade ago is being taken seriously by most of the political players in Ethiopia today. But there is still a lot of skepticism about the applicability of a nonviolent strategy of bringing about change in Ethiopia. So, I think it is worth sharing it again since the message that I was attempting to communicate in the article is still useful today. Since much has changed in Ethiopia since I wrote the article, it is appropriate that I clarify a couple of the points that I had made in the article.

1. I picked the names of two individuals who, I thought, at the time I wrote the article, were an embodiment of the nonviolent movement in Ethiopia. One of the individuals I mentioned was Prof. Beyene Petros. I mentioned him because he was the leader of the SEPDC, the only major party in Ethiopia at that time which explicitly chose a nonviolent form of struggle and made it its signature issue by refering to it in its political program. However, after Beyene's betrayal of the CUD leaders in November last year, who were thrown in jail because they called for a nonviolent civil disobedience campaign to protest the disputed May 2005 elections, I don't consider Beyene Petros to be an advocate of a nonviolent movement in Ethiopia any longer.

2. If I knew then what I know now about former US President Jimmy Carter's ties with the Woyane leaders who rule Ethiopia with iron fist, I would not have written positively about the initiative of the Carter Center to mediate between the Woyane government and the opposition groups in that article. However, knowing the nature of some of the less accommodating sections of the opposition, I do believe that they would have tried to derail any attempt by any other group to find common ground among Ethiopian political groups.

Enjoy the unedited article in its entirety!

A Call to Nonviolence

The current political impasse between the Transitional Government of Ethiopia (TGE) and its opponents should be a cause for great concern to all peace-loving Ethiopians, but especially to those of us who are committed to a nonviolent form of struggle to bring about change in Ethiopia. It was not too long ago when the mere sight of a nonviolence advocate would have been an aberration in the dogmatic world of Ethiopian politics. Not anymore! In the last couple of years, the principles of a nonviolent struggle, which Mahatma Gandhi called Satyagraha (truth-force), have gained much support among members of the enlightened intelligentsia and significant portions of the opposition movements. The emergence of academics such as Dr. Beyene Petros and Prof. Mesfin Wolde Mariam, among many others, in today's Ethiopian politics confirms the growing acceptance of this idea whose time has finally come.

This movement of nonviolence was elevated to a higher level of national importance as a result of the successful completion of the December 1993 Peace and Reconciliation Conference in Addis Ababa. The resolutions adopted at the conclusion of this conference were unequivocal in calling for the escalation of the peaceful struggle to bring peace and democracy to Ethiopia. Although each and every participant at that conference did not take a vow not to ever raise arms again to settle political disputes, it was abundantly clear that the conferees had concluded that a nonviolent means to find solutions to our problems must be given the utmost priority, and this had to be exhausted fully before resorting to any sort of armed struggle.

However, events of the past year have proven that this emerging movement of a nonviolent form of struggle has two bitter enemies who are both determined to prevent it from gaining ground in the Ethiopian political arena. These enemies of peaceful struggle are the TGE and the extremist opposition groups, who both mainly draw their strength from the polarization of the Ethiopian polity along ethnic lines and need each other for their very existence.

For its part, when first confronted by a peaceful movement of a higher moral authority, the TGE was confused and did not know how to react to it. Its decision to renege on its promise to participate at the peace talks sponsored by the Carter Center last February was a good indicator of this confusion and it revealed the TGE's lack of interest in engaging in a peaceful dialogue with the opposition. This decision, which really amounted to a vote of no-confidence on the peace process, exposed the TGE's utter hypocrisy in advancing the cause of peace and its insincerity in dealing with the opposition. But when the TGE finally realized that this peaceful movement was, indeed, a force to be reckoned with and that it is able and prepared to deliver to the Ethiopian people an alternative concept of governance, it then began thwarting all efforts made to bring it to the negotiation table.

This ill-advised decision on the part of the TGE has since fostered a political environment in which it has become more difficult to sell the ideals of a nonviolent movement. On the other hand, this polarized atmosphere has become a godsend to those voices of extremism who preach armed struggle as the only way of forcing the TGE to negotiate, and this, in turn, has encouraged some Ethiopians to sympathize with their divisive message of intolerance. This has played right into the hands of the TGE masterminds who have all along been looking for a pretext to unleash their provocative terror campaigns to silence and discredit the opposition, including the advocates of nonviolence.

For their part, those extremist elements in the opposition camp, who, by the way, do not hide their disdain for the idea of a nonviolent struggle and view it as just an exercise in futility, also did their very best to undermine the development of a positive and constructive political dialogue among Ethiopians. The disinformation campaign these extremist groups waged against the Carter Center initiative was one prime example why these groups are not at all interested in a peaceful process that will inevitably lead to a compromise solution which will not fully please everybody. Their rush to declare the peaceful struggle dead on arrival, as evidenced by their statements made before the December 1993 Peace and Reconciliation Conference, is a clear testament to how little they value the peace process.

These extremists have also been trying in vain to portray the proponents of nonviolence as an out-of-the-mainstream intellectuals who do not understand the mind-set of the Tigrean ruling elite, who themselves had gotten to this point by usurping power from the Derg regime through violent means and has since shown little inclination to share this power with other Ethiopians. Some of them have even gone further than this and have accused us of complicity and conspiring, along with the TGE, to temper their determination to oust the Tigrean "occupying army."

So, it is not then surprising that. this budding nonviolent movement is facing a stiff resistance from all corners of a traditional society such as ours, one that puts a lofty premium on vices like vindictiveness and pride much more than it does on the virtues of peacemaking and humility.

As we debate the future course of the struggle for peace and democracy in our troubled motherland, I would like for us to consider the following hard truths. First, we in the opposition are up against an opponent which is armed from top to toe and is more than willing to flex its muscle anytime and anywhere it is confronted by force. Second, we Ethiopians have already paid dearly in terms of precious human life and limited material resources because of the intransigence of the combatant parties in the protracted civil wars of the last three decades. Third, the state of ethnic relations in Ethiopia at the moment is at its worst, at least since the turn of this century, and, therefore, it is not farfetched to suggest that any future military conflict in Ethiopia is sure to have a decidedly ethnic dimension. The dire consequences of such a conflict are not hard to imagine; it only suffices to look at the carnage in Rwanda, Somalia and Bosnia. Fourth, we Ethiopians are among the poorest inhabitants of this planet Earth, with an annual per capita income of around $110, a life expectancy of only 47 years, and more than half of our population still living in abject poverty. These are only a few of the long list of depressing statistics about our country that most of us do not like to be reminded of. So, may I ask, is it fair to live off the back of our people, and on top of that, still continue to ask them to sacrifice their meager resources to fund military causes that have gotten us into this dungeon in the first place? Need I say more to discourage these extremist groups and the TGE from pursuing their fatalistic adventures?

The extremists would have us believe that conditions in Ethiopia are so intolerable, say, as compared to five or fifteen years ago, that only force will reverse this trend. The arguments advanced by the more sophisticated among them are subtler and even seem to be logical to some extent. For instance, they suggest that some violent actions are required now if we are to avoid a greater destruction later. It's immoral not to fight back against cancer in its earliest stages, so goes their argument. It is the right thing to do to attack it before it spreads around and become incurable, they assert. But this is an age old argument that is designed to appeal to one's emotion, and not to reason, in the context of the Ethiopian political dilemma. For one thing, these warmongers are part of the cancer that is eating away at the fabric of our society. For another, they are the least qualified, of all people, to administer the cure, for the cure they prescribe has proven to be a total bust in the past. Also, these people hopelessly advocate their hollow doctrine of a carrot and stick approach towards the TGE, but, they know it and the Ethiopian people also know that, they do not have the kind of support they need to deliver neither the carrots nor the sticks. This extremist's infatuation with the outmoded Machiavellian tactics of yesteryear confirms more than ever that their primary goal is the usurpation of political power and not the provision of real solutions to the urgent problems that our people face everyday.

Providing real solutions for our people means devising ways in which they will be self-sufficient in feeding themselves rather than begging for handouts on their behalf from the rich nations year after year. Real solutions for our people means investing in their education and health services, and it also means contributing constructively to the economic and socio-political development of our country. Friends, is the suffering of our people from recurring droughts and famines any of your concern? Is the explosion of AIDS cases in Ethiopia a cause for alarm to you? Do you really care about the future of the hundreds of thousands of our young people who are languishing in our cities without jobs or hope? What about our posterity? If your answer to these and other pertinent questions is in the affirmative, then let me humbly suggest to you that it is virtually impossible to direct our attention to addressing these urgent problems when we are devoting our resources to objectives that are inherently destructive. So, I am calling upon you all peace-loving Ethiopians to divest your resources and efforts from all violent methods of struggle and invest them into nonviolent ones.

It is worth noting what Mahatma Gandhi once said to the British viceroy in India at the peak of his peaceful struggle to end British colonial rule in India. He said: "My ambition is no less to convert the British people through nonviolence, and thus make them see the wrong they have done to India. I do not seek to harm your people, I want to serve them even as I want to serve my own..." If Gandhi can bring himself to say this to his colonial rulers, to those who treated him as a second class citizen in his own country, why shouldn't we Ethiopians be able to say the same to each other? Our country's very survival depends on our willingness to find a common ground within our differences.

Gandhi's glorious experiments with a nonviolent struggle have since then been refined and successfully implemented in many countries around the world, most notably in the United States by the Rev. Martin Luther King, Jr., during the Civil Rights movement of the 1950s and 1960s. So, I say, if nonviolence has worked in India, South Africa and the United States, why not try it in Ethiopia? I fervently believe that a militant nonviolent movement is what is needed at this juncture to force the TGE to compromise and join hands with us in rebuilding Ethiopia. I also believe that, given the chance, Ethiopians will choose to solve their problems through peaceful means, and they deserve to have our full support to make it happen. In this process of peaceful struggle we will have learned a lot about ourselves and, hopefully, we could also be role models to others who find themselves in similar predicament.

In parting, I would like to warn the nonchalant and the procrastinators amongst us to recognize that Ethiopia can not be saved from her current slide into mayhem by the efforts of a few individual activists only or by the generosity of her rulers. This can only be accomplished by the full engagement of all Ethiopians in the peaceful struggle and our determination to persist in it till the end.

May-to-May, the Political Saga of Ethiopia

By Ephrem Madebo

In the last twelve months, the journey of the Ethiopian people towards justice and democracy has been wearisome, disappointing, and daunting. Unlike any other time in our entire history, in the last twelve months, we Ethiopians saw the sparks of a democratic process, yet as we started participating in the process, we found ourselves far-flung from democracy. Between May 2005 and May 2006, the Ethiopian people dangled between hope and despair, between power and helplessness and between joy and sorrow. This agonizing emotional rollercoaster has obligated many Ethiopians to re-examine the past and look for alternative ways of solving the seemingly intractable dilemma of our nation. From May 2005 to November 2005, the Deddesa valley and the city of Kaliti were turned in to a makeshift concentration camp for elected MPs, the streets of Addis Ababa were washed with the blood of innocent citizens, teenagers who mourned the death of their friends were charged for genocide, and mothers who protested the arrest of their spouses were shoot on the head. Just like the other eleven months, there are only thirty days in May (Eth.Calendar), but what happened in May 2005 is a haunting iniquity that hangs around to posterity. Evidently, to the citizens of Ethiopia, the May-to-May period is characterized by hope and despondency, by elevation and degradation, and by agony and short lived ecstasy. Everyday, the conscious mind of parents [parents whose children paid the ultimate sacrifice] tussles with the memory of their massacred children, and it takes an instant break each May as it fails to reason out the heartrending loss of life.

The post election drama of Meles started just a day after the election when PM Meles took the role of the legislative body and issued an emergency condition decree. PM Meles who has the “skill” and the “wisdom” to do everything, hurried to write a new law to enable his hardhearted Agazi squad to kill peaceful demonstrators. The PM was conscious of his unconstitutional move, and he also knew the Ethiopian people would disagree with him; however, he made himself the supreme commander of Addis Ababa to kill demonstrators, disregarding the constitution he wrote. In October 2005, Meles Zenawi, the same dictator who wrote the law to confine and/or kill demonstrators, ordered his rubber-stump parliament to remove parliamentary immunity from elected MPs to throw opposition leaders to jail and be a lone player in the Ethiopian political landscape.

Between July 2005 and October 2005, the opposition parties and the EPRDF regime were occupied with the issue of joining the parliament. Why? - Meles’s existence as a “democratic” leader depends on the transparency of the EPRDF system; moreover, Prime Minister Meles knows his survival as a leader depends on the legitimacy of his actions and how donor countries trust him as a lawful leader. Therefore, no matter how disgracefully he put himself back in power; he still wants to give legitimacy to his rubber-stamp parliament by imploring the opposition to join the parliament. On the other side, the opposition rejected the idea of joining an “executive branch” parliament that stripped immunity from its own members to serve the interest of a dictator. The decision of the opposition [CUD, UEDF] to boycott the parliament is crystal clear; it is to deny legitimacy to the Meles parliament. In my opinion, the decision of UEDF and CUD not to join the parliament was not even a boycott, it was a well-timed decision not to join the assemblage of people who lost the election, but found their way to the parliament through political appointment.

The May-to-May transgressions of the EPRDF regime are innumerable; some are daily emerging new tribulations, and yet some are sins accumulated for years. One of the most detestable and enigmatic actions of Meles is his justification for the 1998-2000 war against Eritrea, and his sightless acceptance of the Algiers accord that eventually gave Bademe to Eritrea. Only months after brave Ethiopians disillusioned the speculative ambition of EPLF and freed the area of Bademe; Meles Zenawi, the 21st century Sultan Ibrahim, put the fate of the freed people of Bademe back on the negotiation table. For the first time in the history of mankind a country that lost the war won the very motive of the war. The chameleon PM of Ethiopia, who has an Eritrean face at dawn and who pretends to be an Ethiopian at dusk, ratified a resolution that transferred Ethiopian territory to Eritrea for the second time in fifteen years. Today, Meles is on the verge of handing over Bademe, the Akeldama of Ethiopia, to Eritrea. If Meles is allowed to stay in power for another five years, I believe he will be job less as there will be no part of Ethiopia left to be conveyed to another country. Mournfully, to Ethiopians this can be the beginning of the end, to Meles it is mission accomplished.

In the months of March and April 2006, Meles Zenawi unleashed his retaliatory punch in areas where most people voted for the opposition. According to reliable sources, in rural areas where TPLF lost the election badly, the ruling party cadres and district officials are intimidating and harassing farmers. The implementation of Planned Development projects is being transferred from areas of opposition supporters to areas of EPRDF supporters. Agricultural credit extension services and the distribution of fertilizers are used as weapons to punish farmer who voted for the opposition. Towards the end of March and at the beginning of April 2006, Meles’s killing squad left Addis Ababa and roved the calm squares of Awassa, Leku and Dilla killing the most vulnerable citizens of society, students and teachers. In Gedeo, the ruling party poured its poison among the Gedeo and Gurgahe nationalities causing a confrontation that claimed the life of innocent people.

In the last six months a series of unexplained explosions have been rocking the city of Addis Ababa. Though EPRDF is still trying to fabricate evidence that links opposition parties to the explosions, so far, neither the Ethiopian government nor opposition parties have come forward with a full explanation of the bombings; moreover, none of the home-grown armed groups have claimed responsibility for the bombings. Some Political Analysts who profoundly understand the anatomy of TPLF blame the ruling party for the explosions. In deed, the TPLF regime that went to war for no apparent reason can easily do such cheap blackmailing bits and pieces to blame opposition parties and distract the attention of Ethiopians and the international community.

After May 2005, the political reality of Ethiopia changes daily and takes an indeterminate path. In this sometimes theatrical and sometime callous reality show where victory recedes as one gets closer to it, there are three groups of actors that collide with each other.
In one group there are the Ethiopian people who are determined to talk-the-talk and walk-the-walk, on the second group we have a divided opposition that failed to provide a unified leadership to the popular movement; and on the third group, we have an enemy who is determined to harm our country. Today, many opposition party leaders who defied the titular parliament are jailed. Other opposition parties who preferred the parliamentary path of fighting for justice have joined the parliament. Yet there are some others who started playing a safe game. There is no doubt that there is a slim possibility of exposing TPLF’s empty promise by categorically challenging and opposing every bill that comes to the floor of the House of Representatives, however, one should bear in mind that joining the parliament legitimizes an illegitimate institution that serves the interest of a tyrant. Finally, I have the following advice for the safe players: In the face of the current political reality of Ethiopia, playing safe is the same as playing for the wrong team.

In Ethiopia, the gleaming pre–election democratic process and the election itself were the outcomes of a consistent and bitter struggle of all Ethiopians. Obviously, the popular movement was facilitated by a myriad of political parties and civic organizations that were less coordinated. In fact, lack of coordination and trust between the different political parties has adversely affected the journey of the Ethiopian people towards democracy. From the Paris conference to the Rockville forum of unity and from the nomenclature change of AAPO [AAPO to AEUP] to the formation of CUD; In the last 15 years, the sons and daughters of Ethiopia have tried to forge a united political party, but the much awaited unity eluded Ethiopians as the different parties and groups firmly stood for their minuscule agenda at the cost of the superior national agenda. In my opinion, in the last twelve months, the failure of UEDF and CUD to work together was the worst political debacle that gave life to the otherwise dying regime of TPLF. Between the months of May and September 2005, the heart of Ethiopians was so big and many Ethiopians were ready to bump into their enemy. In September 2005, when the informal alliance of CUD and UEDF called the stay home labor strike, Meles and company were disarrayed and taken aback, however, the shrewd leader of TPLF knew how to pour water on the fire ignited by the opposition, where as the naive and irresolute alliance of CUD and UEDF listened to the Western powers and dropped its ball to negotiate with Meles. The inexperienced opposition gave Meles ample time to cool off the people’s wrath, the only force that could have brought his totalitarian regime to an end. The opposition failed to use its only power, the people’s power. All in all, the net out come of the negotiation was that Meles successfully defused the grenade that would have destroyed him.

Why was Meles Successful?
There are three factors that helped the Meles regime to slow down the popular movement.

Failure to forge a political alliance: In the May 2005 election EPRDF faced a divided and in many cases a competing opposition. In precincts where EPRDF faced a single opposition candidate, the opposition won, where as in places where EPRDF faced multiple opposition candidates it won. In Oromya and South Ethiopia, in some precincts, both UEDF and CUD had multiple candidates running against EPRDF and each other. After the May 2005, many Ethiopians were impatient to see CUD and UEDF work together. In deed, during the first two months after the election, the two parties responded positively. When the opposition negotiated with EPRDF, the two parties worked together, but when the negotiations failed and Meles showed the tendency of playing his preferred game [muscle game], the two opposition groups failed to work together. The failure of the opposition to deliver a unified leadership culminated to its worst level when CUD boycotted the parliament and the two UEDF member organizations, SEPDC and ONC, joined the parliament.

Indecisiveness of the opposition: When donor nations initiated negotiations failed, the opposition displayed its meagerness to decide on matters of national significance when it called off the first round of stay home labor strike. In my opinion, nothing relived the anxiety of Meles like the failure of the opposition to execute its own plan. When UEDF and CUD were making decision to join or not to join the parliament, they should have shared information and should have been matured enough to perceive the strategy of each other and their rival in order to play a win-win game. Over all, the indecisive opposition underestimated its internal forces and it expected much from external elements who repeatedly pushed the opposition to join the parliament.

Power struggle within the opposition: In the last ten years, power struggle within and between the opposition parties has created a favorable conditions for EPRDF. Meles’s swift and harsh crackdown of the CUD leadership was highly attributed to Lidetu Ayalew’s ambition for supremacy and his determination to achieve his objective at any cost. Before and after the election, instead of working with the how to get there strategy, the mind set of some opposition leaders was preoccupied with the idea of what happens after the demise of Meles. All in all, the relationship between the different opposition parties was full of distrust as the parties grappled and watched the movement of each other.

The success of a political party or any organization is highly dependent on the leadership style of the leader. Though leadership style is not the sole decisive factor for organizational success; organizations that have open, flexible, altruist and charismatic leaders usually meet planned objectives. In Ethiopia, the leadership style of some opposition leaders is not qualitatively different from the leadership style of the two consecutive dictators, Mengistu and Meles. Inflexibility, lack of tolerance, lack of compromise, individual ambition to power, and the attitude of “my way or the high way” are still rampant features among some Ethiopian political leaders. To be honest, it is the behind the scene power struggle and lack of constructive dialogue between the leaders of CUD and UEDF that avoided the much needed alliance of the two coalitions. Between 1999 and 2003, a possible political unity between AAPO, SEPDC, EDP and ONC was cut short by the self-seeking leaders of the four organizations. The recent descend of Lidetu from adored “Mandela-like” charismatic leader to the most distrusted and abhorrent political figure in just six months illustrates the unrestrained power monger behavior of our political leaders.

For many generations, lack of dualism was the main deficiency of the Ethiopian political structure, in fact; Ethiopia still lacks true political dualism. The beginning of Meles Zenawi’s regime was marked by the proliferation of parties and political organizations. Today, there are a large number of political parties and civic organizations; however, the Ethiopian political condition is deteriorating with the passage of every single day. The current political impasse of our country clearly indicates that it is about time to move to a qualitative concept of party organization. The existence of numerous parties dilutes the strength of the opposition; likewise, a zealous attempt to propel a single party to a national stage simply downplays the effort of many people whose aphorism is inclusiveness. Today, many opposition party leaders are in jail, regardless of our part affiliation, we all have the responsibility of fighting for their immediate release. During the Apartheid era, black South Africans utterly embraced the ANC which ultimately led them to victory. Our country Ethiopia lacks Mandela like leader and ANC like umbrella organization. In the last fifteen years, when every time our struggle conceived a promising leader, it was always aborted by TPLF; meanwhile the Ethiopian people have always been looking for a “Moses-like” charismatic leader who can lead them to the Promise Land. CUD has tried to lead us to victory in its own way, UEDF has rambled lonely, and OLF and some others have resorted to the use of force. It just didn’t work! Armed struggle or the use of gun might bring an end to the TPLF regime, but, in the first place, armed struggle is a very long process that consumes human life and countless amounts of material resources, secondly, it will never solve political differences except granting temporary political power yet for another dictator.

Currently, almost all of CUDs leaders are in jail, and UEDF is divided in to the domestic, and the exile UEDF. As the old saying “Divided we fall” goes, we are on the verge of failure. All in all, the two main opposition parties are in a mode of partial paralysis. The mission of TPLF is to be a sole actor in the Political scene of Ethiopia; we should never allow this dream of TPLF to materialize. Ethiopia is a combination of the people represented by CUD, UEDF, OLF, SEPDC, and other parties. It is imperative that these parties and other political and civic organizations start working together and bring the long awaited peace and democracy to Ethiopia. Remember, the love and dedication we have to our country is not measured by the quality or quantity of ideas we bring to the table, it is measured by our tolerance to gracefully acknowledge and treasure the idea of others. Each road that we build to walk alone, every dignified idea that we discard, and every progress that we obstruct will only prolong our pain and extend TPLF’s life.

Terrorism: the New Weapon Against Democracy in Ethiopia

By Fikru Helebo

Tsegaye Tadesse of Reuters "reports" on the latest of a series of "mysterious" explosions that have rocked the city of Addis Ababa. It seems to me that some one in Ethiopia is bent on using terror tactics to instill fear among Addis residents to further it goals.

Although no one should be naive enough to discount that these bombings could be the works of a desperate foreign government or a frustrated domestic group, my instinct tells me that these series of bombings have Meles written all over them. Having come under heavy international pressure to resolve the political impasse that is his own making since November 2005, Meles has every reason to portray the opposition as "terrorists" who are bent on creating chaos and instability in the country. For a person who has shown no hesitation whatsoever to give orders to shoot to kill defenseless pro-democracy protesters, to design and execute terrorist incidents like the recent bombings in an attempt to discredit the opposition camp in the eyes of Western donor nations and plant seeds of doubt among some Ethiopians does not require stretching one's imagination.

Ethiopians at home should be on high alert as they go about their daily business and try to do their part to catch and expose this latest Meles scheme for what it is: an abominable terroristic act. I urge them to arm themselves with cameras and practice citizen journalism. If practiced wisely and in a well coordinated manner, I am sure citizen journalism can play a constructive role in hastening the downfall of this terrorist regime. Is is very sad that the very government that is supposed to protect Ethiopians is now, in all likelihood, engaged in terroristic acts to prolong its stay in power.

Public Meeting Announcement

The North America SEPDC Renewal Committee cordially invites Ethiopians in the Washington, DC metro area for a public meeting on Sunday April, 2 2006 at Unification Church. Click here to see the flyer for the announcement in Amharic.

The North America SEPDC Renewal Committee was formed at the end of last month by four individuals from the SEPDC North America branch who disagree with the positions that Professor Beyene Petros has been taking after the May 2005 elections and have also expressed their objections to his undemocratic and divisive leadership style of the organizations that he leads.

YewusT Arawit (Beasts Within)

By Erango Kelbisow

Click on the image of the poem to enlarge it.

Rubber Stamp Parliament I

By Fikru Helebo

Three months ago today, in the aftermath of the November killings and arrests of opposition leaders and supporters through out Ethiopia, I wrote an article urging opposition parliamentarians who joined parliament to withdraw from parliament. I argued in that article that the only useful purpose the presence of oppositions MPs in parliament would serve is to give legitimacy to an illegitimate regime. I directed my call for withdrawal to those parliamentarians belonging to the Southern Ethiopia Peoples Democratic Coalition (SEPDC) because this is a group I had supported in the past. But my call could just as well have been directed at all opposition MPs. Sadly, the eleven SEPDC MPs as well as many MPs belonging to the other opposition parties have made an ill-advised decision to remain in that parliament.

It goes without saying that the opposition MPs are well within their right to join and remain in that parliament. After all, they were duly elected and they have a duty to represent the constituent that elected them. However, there is a higher duty that these opposition MPs were elected to uphold. These MPs were elected at a very critical time in the history of the nation and, as such, their main duty was to be a beacon of hope for a people that have been yearning for a representative form of government for more than three decades. They were elected to play a vanguard role in the budding movement for democracy, not to go through the motions of a rubberstamp parliament that has been tried in the previous parliament. The Ethiopian people deserve a much better representation from their elected representatives than what these MPs are willing to give it to them.

Instead, the opposition MPs have allowed themselves to be used by a regime that wants to force its fraudulent win in the May 2005 election on Ethiopians through terror and bribery. These MPs have chosen expediency over principle at a time when it is obvious that principle should rule the day. They have abandoned the awesome responsibility of doing what is right and what is in the best interest of Ethiopians that came with their election at this historic time. To put it bluntly, they have chosen to pursue their own personal interests rather than that of the public's interest. Ultimately though, it is up to the Ethiopian people to pass judgment on these opposition MPs, and the day of reckoning for them will be here before we know it. In the mean time, however, we need to keep tabs on how these MPs are doing in parliament and assess their performance or lack thereof from time to time. I will attempt to do this from the perspective of the SEPDC MPs in my next article.

Recommendations to the SEPDC Leadership

By Concerned Members and Supporters

For Immediate Release

[Amharic Version]

February 22, 2006

A seriously concerned group consisting of members and supporters of the Southern Ethiopia People's Democratic Coalition (SEPDC), residing in North America, advanced a series of recommendations to the SEPDC leadership in the wake of the ongoing political crisis in Ethiopia. The group is deeply concerned about the integrity of the Southern Ethiopia movement and the organization that currently represents it, in view of the recent behavior of the leaders, particularly the non-transparent and divisive manner in which they joined the parliament.

The group believes that the Southern movement is guided by the need for equitable and full participation of the peoples of the South in Ethiopian politics and its fair contribution to the social and economic development of the country. As such, the movement should be aligned with the popular struggle in Ethiopia that is currently under way. In this spirit, the group convened a couple of telephonic meetings in November and conveyed the following to the SEPDC leadership:

• Immediate and unconditional release of all prisoners arrested in connection with the May 2005 election controversy and recent protest by the opposition.
• 
  
Immediate and unconditional cease of persecution of opposition leaders, members and supporters by the government.
• 
  
Immediate and unconditional reversal of the resolution that removed political immunity of the elected parliamentarians.
• 
  
Immediate and unconditional return of the government and opposition to the negotiation table to discuss items presented by the opposition groups.
• 
  
If the government refuses to respond to these items or wants to delay it by more than seven days, withdraw from the parliament and join the Ethiopian people outside the parliament.

The SEPDC leadership responded to our letter on time, but the group found it entirely unsatisfactory. Consequently, a follow-up and extended telephonic meeting was held in December. After a lengthy discussion, a decision was taken to send a follow-up letter [see below] detailing the group's reasons for finding the response unsatisfactory and then asking the SEPDC leadership to reconsider its position. There were 15 individuals from various states in the US whose names were appended to the letter as signatories. The group consisted of long-term members and supporters of SEPDC, including some members of the organization's central committee, who are now residing in the United States.

The group has particularly been known for its continuing support of the SEPDC under the leadership of Dr. Beyene Petros and his colleagues. However, Dr. Beyene and the other members of the executive committee kept the letter hostage on procedural grounds, and the letter was not even presented to the SEPDC leadership (Central Committee). We are deeply disappointed that the letter continues to be held hostage, and at this stage we have no choice but to go public with our collective effort to salvage the Southern Ethiopian movement in the face of the misguided approach that the SEPDC leadership has adopted. Hereby we are releasing our second letter in its entirety. We wish to emphasize that we are forever committed to the advancement of the peoples of Southern Ethiopia and will continue to support their rightful participation in the struggle for democracy, justice and the rule of law.

Follow-up Letter:

December 15, 2005
The Central Committee of the Southern Ethiopia People's Democratic Coalition (SEPDC)
C/O Dr. Beyene Petros
P.O.Box 30751
Addis Ababa, Ethiopia

Dear Committee Members,

Pursuant to your response to our recommendations, we have held two telephone conferences. The final telephone conference (TC) group attracted twenty-four individuals and it involved two hours of heated exchange. The TC group came to the following conclusions and action items.

1. The TC group appreciated the manner in which the CC took our recommendations seriously and discussed them in full faith.

2. The essence of our letter to you was to urge the SEPDC leadership and the MPs to fully participate in the popular struggle for democracy in Ethiopia and to withdraw from the parliament if certain minimum conditions were not met. The TC group concluded that the SEPDC CC rejected our recommendations. Further, the group observed that the CC's meeting to reaffirm the decision of the Executive Committee to remain in the parliament was convened despite and after the TC group submitted a set of recommendations to the organization.

3. The group is dissatisfied with the reasons adopted for rejecting our recommendations. While the group understands that the SEPDC leadership is in a better position to know the exact details of the challenges and the opportunities the organization and the people are facing, there are facts and developments that are readily available to all of us regarding the current political situation in the country, the government's anti-democratic actions, and popular response against them.

4. On your decision to remain in the parliament, you wish to base it on the future events that may affect the extent to which you will be productive in your struggle. You may then consider leaving it altogether if you find it hard to function through the parliament. The group, however, seriously doubts if anything of a measurable value can be achieved in a parliament where a new regulation requires 51% of the house to put an item on the agenda. In fact, the mere presence of an opposition in a parliament deemed unlawful by the people can only be considered as passive acquiescence with the actions of the regime that has resorted to repression and force to stay in power.

5. SEPDC is a democratic organization that advocates democracy and practices democracy in its decision-making processes. It is the belief of the TC group that the way the executive committee of the SEPDC decided to join the parliament was not transparent and was divisive.

6. The SEPDC leadership considers joining the parliament a mature tactical political move, but the TC group is yet to see any accomplishments thus far, particularly in reversing the procedural rules of the parliament that was decreed by the retiring MPs and in securing promises from the regime to release political prisoners jailed during the most recent popular uprising. In fact, SEPDC must establish a working relationship with CUDP to assist them secure release of their leaders and advancement of the demands of the opposition, including the establishment of a government of national unity and an independent election board.

7. The TC group initiated these discussions to address SEPDC related issues as they relate to the political situation in the country and government actions against the people's movement for democracy and rule of law. The outstanding issues within the UEDF did not and do not constitute the core of our communications. The TC group is constituted by individuals that have supported the SEPDC and the people of the south for years, and have the knowledge of the intricate relationships within the Ethiopian opposition. Thus, we reject any suggestion that the TC group may be acting as a conduit for political interests of other groups outside the Southern movement.

8. It should be recognized that the role of members and supporters of the SEPDC and the Southern movement is not limited to financial resources, but it should also include input to tactical and strategic issues facing the organization and the movement. The TC group strongly believes that the Southern movement should be completely aligned with the popular Ethiopian movement, including with those civic organizations that promote democratization, at this critical juncture in the country's history.

9. As a result of our recommendations being rejected by the SEPDC leadership and our dissatisfaction with the reasons given to us, we are asking again the leadership to reconsider its position and accept our recommendations, the essence of which is stated in item #2 above. We would appreciate your response to this letter by January 8, 2006. If you continue to stay in the parliament, we believe you should initiate a public debate with the people that you represent on the benefits and adverse consequences of your actions.

10. We sincerely hope that the leadership will reverse its approach. Otherwise, we think this misguided approach carries the danger of derailing the southern movement that has been nurtured over a decade, while misaligning the struggle of the Southern Ethiopian Peoples with the rest of the Ethiopian movement at this critical juncture. At this stage, we (TC group) have no choice but disassociate ourselves from the leadership's misguided approach. We will, however, continue to support the struggle of the Southern Ethiopian peoples and quest for democratization in Ethiopia.

Sincerely,

Concerned Members and Supporters (list of names of individuals included in the original letter)